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Abstract
Drawing on ideas from game theory and quantum physics, we investigate nonlocal cor-
relations from the point of view of equilibria in games of incomplete information. These
equilibria can be classified in decreasing power as general communication equilibria, belief-
invariant equilibria and correlated equilibria, all of which contain the familiar Nash equilibria.
The notion of belief-invariant equilibrium has appeared in game theory before (in the
1990s). However, the class of non-signalling correlations associated to belief-invariance
arose naturally already in the 1980s in the foundations of quantum mechanics: Indeed, since
quantum theory is consistent with relativistic causality, quantum mechanical correlations
are non-signalling.
In the present work, we explain and unify these two origins of the idea and study the
above classes of equilibria, and furthermore quantum correlated equilibria, using tools from
quantum information but the language of game theory. We present a general framework of
belief-invariant communication equilibria, which contains correlated equilibria and quantum
correlated equilibria as special cases. Our framework also contains the theory of Bell in-
equalities and their violation due to non-locality, which is a question of intense interest in the
foundations of quantum mechanics, and was indeed the original motivation for the above-
mentioned studies. Moreover, we can model quantum games where players have conflicting
interests, a recent developing topic in physics.
We then use our framework to show new results related to the social welfare of games.
Namely, we exhibit a game where belief-invariance is socially better than any correlated
equilibrium, and a game where all non-belief-invariant communication equilibria have a
suboptimal social welfare. We also show that optimal social welfare can in certain cases
be achieved by quantum mechanical correlations, which do not need an informed mediator
to be implemented, and go beyond the classical “sunspot” or shared randomness approach.
Furthermore, we illustrate potential practical applications related to privacy. For instance,
situations where competing companies can benefit from a correlated strategy that does not
expose their trade secrets, or network congestion games where privacy-preserving advice
reduces the congestion.
Along the way, we highlight open questions about the interplay between quantum infor-
mation, cryptography, and game theory.
∗Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell’Informazione ed Elettrica e Matematica applicata (DIEM), Universita` degli
Studi di Salerno, Italy. Email: auletta@unisa.it
†Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell’Informazione ed Elettrica e Matematica applicata (DIEM), Universita` degli
Studi di Salerno, Italy. Email: dferraioli@unisa.it
‡Faculty of Computing, University of Latvia. Email: ashutosh.rai@lu.lv
§Facultad de Ciencias Matema´ticas, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain. Email: gscarpa@ucm.es
¶ICREA and Departament de F´ısica: Grup d’Informacio´ Qua`ntica, Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona,
Spain. Email: andreas.winter@uab.cat
1
1 Introduction
The notion of equilibrium of a strategic game and the mathematical formulation of rational
behaviour in situations of conflict are among the most fruitful ideas in the history of economics,
and duly became a cornerstone of any modern discussion on the subject.
The topic was initiated by the classic treatment of von Neumann and Morgenstern [vNM44],
where it was realized that in the realm of mixed strategy there is always a minimax equilibrium
for zero-sum games. Another milestone was the definition of Nash equilibrium [Nas50] and
Nash’s proof that in mixed strategies there always exists one. These pioneering results were
followed by a multitude of further investigations into other concepts of equilibrium and their
properties, including the question of how the players, knowing the game, can find one [Aum74,
For93, LH64, DGP09, CDT09]. Motivated, among other things, by the realization that Nash
equilibria sometimes can be “bad” both individually and collectively for the players, a major
direction in game theory is the question of how to induce players, or help them, to a more
beneficial equilibrium [FT91, Mye91, NRTV07]. One important idea is that giving the players
advice, in the form of a random variable, can change the landscape of equilibria. This generalizes
the concept of Nash equilibrium to correlated equilibria [Aum74].
The present paper is about advice in the setting of games of incomplete information. As
it turns out, this is a subject of considerable complexity, since the kind of correlation that can
serve as advice to the players can be far more general than in the case of complete information.
In games of incomplete information, or Bayesian games, each player has a type which is not
perfectly known to, but only estimated by, the other players. Depending on what the game
models, a type can be many things. For example, it can represent a characteristic of the
player (strong, weak, rich, poor, etc.) or a secret objective of the player (interest in one
particular outcome). For this class of games, a relevant solution concept is the communication
equilibrium [For82]. Here, the players privately communicate their type to a mediator, who
implements a correlation and gives each player advice for a convenient action. It is reasonable
to assume that players are comfortable with revealing their private information to a trusted
mediator if this gives them an advantage. However, there are situations where it might be crucial
for players never to reveal any private information to the other players (e.g., trade secrets). In
game theory, this concept has been noted before when discussing correlations. In [For93, For06]
it is called “conditional independence property” or “belief-invariance”, while in [LRS10] it is
called “non-communicating garbling” and in [Liu15] is called “individually uninformativeness”.
In the above cases, however, this property is used to make the analysis of the equilibria more
convenient, and is not highlighted as interesting in its own right.
From a completely different angle, belief-invariance has been a topic of research in physics
(motivated by questions in the foundations of quantum mechanics [PR94, Tsi80, BLM+05,
MAG06]) and theoretical computer science (motivated by multi-prover interactive proof sys-
tems [KRR14] and parallel repetition of games [BFS14, FRV16, LW15]), under the name of
non-signalling correlations. In these investigations, belief-invariance is relevant because it de-
scribes the largest class of correlations that obey relativistic causality.
Here, we bring together the strands of thought coming from these two backgrounds. On the
one hand, this results in a more general and much richer picture of non-locality as a resource
and, on the other hand, allows us to import findings from the physics of non-locality and non-
signalling to game theory. The interdisciplinarity leaves us with the problem of choosing the
language in which to formulate our results, as we might end up not reaching anyone from either
side of the discipline divide. We have chosen to use a language familiar to game theorists, but
hopefully not too far from the one used in physics and computer science.
We define and study the class of belief-invariant communication equilibria and compare
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it with the classes of communication equilibria and correlated equilibria. We discuss, always
in the language of game theory, relevant examples from physics [CHSH69, GHSZ90, BL13,
PKL+15] and we introduce new ones. Our examples are applied to the study of the social
welfare of games. Namely, we exhibit a game where belief-invariance is socially better than
any correlated equilibrium, and a game where all non-belief-invariant communication equilibria
have a suboptimal social welfare.
We then proceed to show that there is a subclass of the belief-invariant correlations that
gives rise to the interesting concept of “fully private correlations”: correlations that reveal the
type of a player neither to the other players nor to the mediator, and still can achieve equilibrium
outcomes that would be impossible without an informed mediator. However, to implement this
class one needs to rely on quantum mechanical effects. For this reason, in a stand-alone section,
we give a brief introduction to some basic linear algebraic notions behind quantum mechanics
and we consider a class of correlations that arises from observing a shared quantum mechanical
state. We will prove that there are games for which the resulting equilibria have better social
welfare than the ones that may be achieved without quantum effects. Note that we need games
of incomplete information to exhibit this quantum advantage: Zhang [Zha12] proved that in
games of full information, there can be no quantum advantage. The use of quantum mechanical
correlations in game theory has been studied in many forms and flavours, as can be seen from the
survey [GZK08], the references therein, and the more recent works [BL13, PKL+15]. However,
to the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to unify communication equilibria, belief
invariance, quantum equilibria and correlated equilibria in a general framework.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 defines the objects we are working on: first
games of incomplete information and then various classes of correlations. Section 3 uses these
concepts to define the classes of equilibria we study. In Section 4 we discuss some meaningful
examples where belief-invariance helps reaching a better social outcome. In Section 5, we will
discuss some practical applications of our new definitions. No quantum physics is involved in
the sections above; only in Section 6 we broaden the discussion to include the quantum case,
and we will present it in a way that makes it fit into the framework we have developed up to
that point. Finally, we will discuss some open problems in the conclusions section.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we define the basic concepts we need to discuss our classes of equilibria. First
we will define games of incomplete information and their strategies. Later, we will define the
notion of correlation and the classes of probability distributions we need.
2.1 Games with incomplete information
There are several slightly different notations for games of incomplete information. We will follow
the one of Forges [For06] because of the closeness with our topic. We find it convenient to work
with games in strategic form because of the similarity with the approach in quantum information
to so-called non-local games. In a game in strategic form, in a single round, all players make
their moves simultaneously, and receive their respective payoffs. It is worth mentioning that
games of incomplete information, as presented here, are also called Bayesian games (because
there is a fixed prior distribution on the types), and can be analyzed in a probability theory
setting.
A game with incomplete information G is defined by the following objects:
• A finite set of players N , of size n, usually N = [n];
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• A finite set of type profiles T := T1 × · · · × Tn;
• A finite set of action profiles A := A1 × · · · ×An;
• A prior probability distribution P (t) on the types t ∈ T ;
• For each player i ∈ N , a payoff function vi : T ×A→ R.
In a game of incomplete information, the behaviour of the players is modelled as follows. A
strategy gi for the player i is a map from the information that i knows to an action ai ∈ Ai. In the
absence of any correlation or external advice, players can apply pure strategies or mixed ones. A
pure strategy for player i is a map gi : Ti → Ai, meaning that players select an action based only
on their type. A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over pure ones, i.e. the
function gi : Ti → Ai becomes a random variable. If we want to make its distribution explicit,
we introduce the independent local random variables λi with probability Λi(λi). and we set
gi = gi,λi = gi(·, λi). This random function describes a conditional probability distribution on
Ai given Ti, denoted by slight abuse of notation as gi(ai | ti).
The game goes as follows. The types t = (t1, . . . , tn) are sampled according to P . Each
player i learns his type ti, uses his strategy gi to select an action ai ∈ Ai, and is awarded
according to his payoff function vi (which in general depends also on the other players’ actions
and types). Hence, the expected utility of player i is:
〈vi〉 = Et,gvi
(
t, g1(t1), . . . , gn(tn)
)
=
∑
t,a
P (t)vi(t,a)
n∏
i=1
gi(ai | ti), (1)
where g = (g1, . . . , gn) and a = (a1, . . . , an). Observe that if P is a point mass on a fixed type
t0, P (t0) = 1, we recover the usual games of complete information.
A game is called full coordination game if all the payoff functions are equal, i.e., all players
are interested in the same outcome. On the other hand, if the payoff functions are distinct, we
talk about a game of conflicting interests.
A solution for a game is a family of strategies g = (g1, . . . , gn), one for each player. Players
are modelled as being selfish and rational, meaning that fixing the other players’ strategies, each
player chooses the strategy that maximizes his own expected payoff, by using the resources he
has access to. A solution is then said to be an equilibrium (more precisely a Nash equilibrium)
if no player has an incentive to change the adopted strategy. In the basic, uncorrelated, case,
this means that
〈vi〉 = Et,g−ivi
(
t,g(t)gi(ti)
)
≥ EtEg−ivi
(
t,g−i(t−i)χi(ti)
)
, (2)
for all i and χi ∈ A
Ti
i . This can be expressed more concisely as saying that for all i, ti and ai,∑
t−i,λ
P (t)Λ(λ)vi(t,g−i(t−i,λ−i)gi(ti, λi)) ≥
∑
t−i,λ
P (t)Λ(λ)vi(t,g−i(t−i,λ−i)ai), (3)
where λ = (λ1, . . . , λn), and, by independence of λi, Λ(λ) =
∏n
i=1 Λi(λi).
Note also that a game of incomplete information can be modelled as a game of complete
information where the players’ strategies are ATii = {gi : Ti → Ai}, i.e., all possible functions
from Ti to Ai. Then, by Nash’s theorem [Nas50], every game of incomplete information has an
equilibrium. In fact, as is familiar from games of complete information, usually – except in the
simplest situations – we have to expect several Nash equilibria to exist, with different payoff
profiles (〈vi〉 : i ∈ N).
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The expected social welfare SW(g) of a solution g is the sum of the expected payoffs of all
players, SW(g) =
∑
i 〈vi〉, and often used as a measure of the quality of an equilibrium. More
generally, we may consider some other function v(t,a) of the types and actions (e.g., the max of
the expected payoffs of all players is the measure that is commonly adopted in the job scheduling
setting [AT01]), and look at the social payoff SPO defined as follows:
SPO(g) = 〈v〉 = Et,gv
(
t,g(t)
)
.
Example: CHSH game [CHSH69]. We now give an example of game of incomplete informa-
tion. The game is a classic example from quantum information, that later was also independently
found in game theory (cf. [For06, LRS10, Liu15]). We will refer to this game several times in
the paper. The game is called CHSH after the authors of [CHSH69], Clauser, Horne, Shimony
and Holt.
It is a two-player game, with respective types and actions of players (t1, t2) and (a1, a2). Both
players’ types and actions are single bits, taking values from the set {0, 1}. The distribution P
on the types (t1, t2) is uniform, i.e. probability
1
4 is assigned to each of the four possibilities.
The game is a full coordination game, i.e., the payoff functions v1, v2 are equal and the players
want to achieve a common goal. The payoffs are as in Figure 1. In other words, the two players
0 1
0 1,1 0,0
1 0,0 1,1
t1 · t2 = 0
0 1
0 0,0 1,1
1 1,1 0,0
t1 · t2 = 1
Figure 1: The CHSH game
prefer to correlate if at least one of them has the first type (which happens with probability 34),
and to anti-correlate if they both have the second type (with probability 14 ).
A simple pure strategy for each player in the CHSH game is the constant function mapping
to 0. Since the distribution P is uniform, such joint action by players give an expected payoff
of 34 . It is not hard to see that this cannot be improved with other pure or mixed, or correlated
strategies. Later we will see that, in presence of external devices, other equilibria exist that
reach the optimal expected payoff of 1.
2.2 Correlations: joint conditional probability distributions
Looking at eq. (1), we see that for a well-defined expected payoff, we only need a joint distri-
bution of t = (t1, . . . , tn) and a = (a1, . . . , an). In fact, since the marginal distribution P (t) of
the types is fixed, we only require a conditional distribution of a given t.
This motivates us to consider, as a resource in gameplay, a general correlation, i.e. a joint
conditional probability distribution
Q(s1, . . . , sn | r1, . . . , rn)
of inputs ri and outputs si for player i. We may abbreviate the notation as Q(s | r) for tuples
r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ R =×iRi and s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S =×i Si, where Ri and Si are the input
and output alphabets of player i, respectively.
Note that we do not assume any restriction on these correlations, apart from the obvious
requirements of probability distributions:∑
s
Q(s | r) = 1 ∀r.
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Given a set R of inputs and a set S of outputs we denote as ALL(S | R), the set of all possible
correlations on these sets.
By imposing additional restrictions we can single out other meaningful subclasses of corre-
lations, that we will use later to define different kinds of equilibrium.
Belief-invariant (aka non-signalling) correlations. A joint conditional probability distri-
bution Q is belief-invariant (also called non-signalling) if the distribution of the output variable
si given ri does not give any information about rj , with j 6= i. This class is easily seen to be
strictly contained in the general class of correlations. Indeed, the belief-invariant condition is
clearly violated in a correlation where si could be just equal to rj , i.e., Pr{si = rj} = 1.
The names belief-invariant and non-signalling can be understood in the following way. Sup-
pose we have n parties, with the i-th party having access only to ri, si. Then the observation of
ri, si does not reveal anything more about the other parties’ rj variables than ri alone. There-
fore if the parties had a estimation (belief) of what could be the others’ variables, this is not
changed by the observation of the outputs of the correlation Q.
Formally, for a set I ⊂ N , let RI =×i∈I Ri and SI =×i∈I Si. Then, we say that a
correlation Q(s | r) is belief-invariant [KRR14] for all subsets I ⊂ N and J = N \ I,∑
sJ∈SJ
Q(sI , sJ | rI , rJ) =
∑
sJ∈SJ
Q(sI , sJ | rI , r
′
J) ∀sI ∈ SI , rI ∈ RI , rJ , r
′
J ∈ RJ . (4)
Given a set R of inputs and a set S of outputs we denote as BINV(S | R), the set of all belief-
invariant correlations on these sets.
We remark that this class of correlations has various equivalent definitions (see, for example,
[MAG06]), but we prefer the one given above since it makes it clear that any subset of parties,
even when getting together, cannot learn anything more about the other subset’s input variables
than what they would know from the joint distribution of their {Ri}i∈I alone.
Local correlations. A joint conditional probability distribution Q is called local if it can be
simulated locally by each party i, by observing (their part of) a random variable γ = (γ1, . . . , γn)
(with distribution V (γ)) independent of r, and doing local operations depending only on ri
and γi. More formally, a correlation Q(s | r) is local if there exist a random variable γ and
distributions Li(si | riγi) such that
Q(s | r) =
∑
γ
V (γ)L1(s1 | r1γ1) · · ·Ln(sn | rnγn). (5)
Any local distribution is also belief-invariant, because the condition (4) is respected. However,
the opposite is not true, meaning that the inclusion is strict. An example of non-local belief-
invariant distribution is given below in (10).
As above, given a set R of inputs and a set S of outputs we denote as LOC(S | R), the set
of all local correlations on these sets. We remark that the sets ALL(S | R), BINV(S | R) and
LOC(S | R) are all closed convex sets.
3 Equilibria with communication and correlation resources
Consider a game G = (N,T,A, P, {vi}) as defined in Section 2.1. A solution with communication
for G studies the behaviour of players who have access to a correlation device that depends on
inputs communicated by them during the game. The most common operational interpretation
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of this setting is that a trusted mediator, who has private communication channels with all the
players, collects from each player i the input ri, samples s according to Q(s | r) and sends to
each i the output si.
Formally, we add to the strategies of the players the use of a correlation Q(s | r), where
r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ R is a tuple of inputs and s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S is a tuple of outputs. In this
setting, a pure strategy for each player i is a pair of functions, fi : Ti → Ri and gi : Ti×Si → Ai;
and a mixed strategy is a pair of jointly distributed random functions (fi, gi) ∈ R
Ti
i × A
Ti×Si
i .
As done above, the latter can be given explicitly by specifying a local random variable λi for
each player i with distribution Λi(λi), and letting fi = fi,λi = fi(·, λi), gi = gi,λi = gi(·, λi). The
joint distribution of λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) is a product distribution, Λ(λ) =
∏n
i=1 Λi(λi), reflecting
the fact that the n pairs {(fi, gi) : i = 1, . . . , n} are independent.
The game now goes as follows. The types t = (t1, . . . , tn) are sampled according to P . Each
player i learns his type ti, and sends the input ri = fi(ti) to the correlation device. He then
gets the correlation output si and plays the action ai = gi(ti, si). This makes all of t, r, f , g
and a jointly distributed random variables. The expected payoff of player i is:
〈vi〉 = Et,f ,g,Qvi
(
t, g1(t1, s1), . . . , gn(tn, sn)
)
=
∑
t,s,λ
P (t)Λ(λ)Q
(
s | f1(t1, λ1), . . . , fn(tn, λn)
)
vi
(
t, g1(t1, s1, λ1), . . . , gn(tn, sn, λn)
)
.
We now give the definitions of some classes of equilibria, introduced by Forges [For82], that
are meaningful in this setting with communication: communication equilibria, belief-invariant
communication equilibria and correlated equilibria. A new class, namely quantum equilibria,
will be defined later in Section 6. Communication and correlated equilibria were explicitly
discussed in previous work, notably [Aum74, For82, For93, For06]. The intermediate class of
belief-invariant (and the quantum variant of Section 6) was previously discussed only indirectly
in some works, for example [For93, LRS10, PKL+15].
3.1 Communication equilibrium
The most general class we consider here is the class of communication equilibria. Here, we
assume that the correlation device can implement a correlation Q that is unrestricted. We will
obtain later two meaningful subclasses by restricting the class of available correlations.
In order to formally define a solution for a game we need to describe not only the cor-
relation Q implemented by the correlation device, but also the strategies, i.e., the functions
{fi} and {gi}, and the private randomness used by the players. To this aim, given an n-
tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn), we use the standard abbreviation x−i to denote the (n − 1)-tuple
(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn), i.e., x with the i-th entry removed. Similarly, if f = (f1, . . . , fn)
is a family of functions in which each fi is a function of an argument xi, we denote f−i =
(f1, . . . , fi−1, fi+1, . . . , fn) the family with the i-th member removed, and by f−i(x−i) the tuple
of values f1(x1), . . . , fi−1(xi−1), fi+1(xi+1), . . . , fn(xn).
Definition 1 (Communication equilibrium). A solution (f ,g, Q) is a communication equilib-
rium of a game G if for each player i and for all random functions ϕi : Ti → Ri and χi : Si → Ai,∑
t,λ,s
P (t)Λ(λ)Q(s | fi(ti, λi)f−i(t−i,λ−i))vi(t, gi(ti, si, λi)g−i(t−i, s−i,λ−i))
≥
∑
t,λ,s
P (t)Λ(λ)Q(s | ϕi(ti, λi)f−i(t−i,λ−i))vi(t, χi(ti, si, λi)g−i(t−i, s−i,λ−i)).
(6)
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This definition captures the idea of having no incentive to deviate unilaterally, but it may
seem a formidable task to verify the conditions it imposes. Note that it is w.l.o.g. to assume
that in the above definition ϕi and χi are deterministic, i.e., not depending on λi. Hence, it
easily follows that we do not have to go over all functions ϕi, but it is sufficient to go over all
its possible outputs ri, as stated by the next proposition.
Proposition 2. A solution (f ,g, Q) is a communication equilibrium of a game G if for all i,
ti, ri and functions χi ∈ A
Ti×Si
i ,∑
t−i,λ,s
P (t)Λ(λ)Q(s | f(t,λ)vi(t,g(t, s,λ))
≥
∑
t−i,λ,s
P (t)Λ(λ)Q(s | rif−i(t−i,λ−i))vi(t, χi(ti, si)g−i(t−i, s−i,λ−i)).
The canonical form. Definition 1 is useful for understanding the subclasses of equilibria
we define later. However, it is possible to express the communication equilibria in a simpler
canonical form, where players communicate their types (not a function of the type) to the
correlation device, and the latter returns the actions they have to take (not only an information
from which players compute their action). The intuition is that the mediator, who implements
the correlation Q(s | r) also takes care of the computation of the functions ri = fi(ti) and
ai = gi(ti, si). Starting from a general communication solution (f ,g, Q), we construct a new
solution where we have a correlation Q̂(a | t) in which inputs are types, outputs are actions,
and which works as follows:
Q̂(a | t) =
∑
λ
Λ(λ)
∑
s : g(t,s,λ)=a
Q(s | f(t,λ)). (7)
It is clear that the expected payoffs for this solution when the players truthfully reveal their type
and take the suggested action (that is, when their strategy corresponds to identity functions id
both for inputs and outputs) are the same as those of the original solution:
〈vi〉 =
∑
t,a
P (t)Q̂(a | t)vi(t,a).
Furthermore, we have the following important proposition.
Proposition 3. If (f ,g, Q) is a communication equilibrium, then the associated canonical strat-
egy (id, id, Q̂) is a communication equilibrium with the same expected payoffs. In words, no
player has an incentive to communicate a false type, or to take an action different from the one
suggested.
Proof. Since (f ,g, Q) is an equilibrium, no player has an incentive in communicating a false
type or in taking an action different from the one that has been suggested. If in Q̂ there is a
player i who can increase his expected payoff by deviating from the suggested action on a type
ti, then the same deviation would increase the expected payoff of player i in (f ,g, Q) for ti.
This contradicts the assumption that (f ,g, Q) is an equilibrium. It follows that (id, id, Q̂) is
an equilibrium as well. Because it preserves the conditional distribution of actions given types
of (f ,g, Q), it also preserves the expected payoffs.
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Notice that there are (infinitely) many equilibria (f ,g, Q) that lead to the same canonical
equilibrium Q̂. In fact, (7) and Proposition 3 imply an equivalence relation on solutions. Also
notice that each equivalence class of a communication equilibrium contains exactly one canonical
equilibrium, which we call the canonical representative.
Note also that, since the communicated information comprises only types and actions, these
are the only two deviations that a player can take. Therefore, we can simplify the notion of
communication equilibrium as follows.
Definition 4 (Canonical communication equilibrium). A solution (id, id, Q) is a canonical
communication equilibrium if there exists an equilibrium (f ,g, Q′) in its equivalence class, i.e. if
the former is the canonical representative of the latter, Q = Q̂′.
Equivalently, in light of the above proposition, (id, id, Q) is a canonical communication
equilibrium if for all i, ti, ri and αi ∈ A
Ai
i a function from Ai to itself,∑
t−i,a−i
P (t)Q(a | t)vi(t,a) ≥
∑
t−i,a−i
P (t)Q(a | rit−i)vi(t, αi(ai)a−i). (8)
The above observations imply that as far as communication equilibria are concerned, we
may without loss of generality restrict our attention to their canonical representatives. Then,
for given game G, we denote as Comm(G) the set of canonical communication equilibria for G.
The next proposition shows that, for every game, this is a convex set.
Proposition 5. If (id, id, Q1) and (id, id, Q2) are canonical communication equilibria for the
same game G, then so is (id, id, Q), with Q = pQ1 + (1− p)Q2, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Proof. Consider the following correlation, with a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A, b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ {0, 1}
n
and t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T :
Q′(a,b | t) =


pQ1(a | t) if b1 = b2 = . . . = bn = 0,
(1− p)Q2(a | t) if b1 = b2 = . . . = bn = 1,
0 otherwise.
That is, Q′ chooses with probability p and 1−p to provide Q1 and Q2, respectively, and informs
the players of its choice along with the recommended actions a. Thus it is clear from the fact
that (id, id, Q1) and (id, id, Q2) are equilibria, that (id, id, Q
′) (where players do not output
the bi variables) is an equilibrium, too. The proof is concluded by observing that Q = Q̂′ is the
canonical representative of Q′.
An example. Consider again the CHSH game described above. A communication equilibrium
for the CHSH game consists in players revealing their type to the mediator, receiving information
about which game are they playing (i.e., information about the type of the other player), and
which action they are suggested to play in that game, and following the advice of the mediator.
Formally, consider inputs (r1, r2) ∈ T and outputs (s1, s2) where si ∈ Ai × {0, 1}. Moreover,
consider a correlation Q such that Q(00, 00 | r1 · r2 = 0) = 1 and Q(01, 11 | r1 · r2 = 1) = 1.
Then, the solution (id, s1, Q), where s1 is the function that returns the first bit of the advice s
received by the player, is a communication equilibrium, since all players have expected payoff 1
and no action can be taken in order to increase this payoff.
Note also that this equilibrium is not canonical, since the mediator is not just suggesting
an action, but more complex advices are given. Anyway, it is immediate to transform above
equilibrium in a canonical one, by requiring the mediator to return only the action players are
suggested to take.
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3.2 Belief-invariant equilibrium
We obtain the subclass of belief-invariant equilibria by requiring that the correlation used in
the equilibrium is in the class of belief-invariant correlations.
Definition 6 (Belief-invariant equilibrium). A solution (f ,g, Q) is called belief-invariant if Q
is a belief-invariant correlation. If (f ,g, Q) is a communication equilibrium, we call it a belief-
invariant (communication) equilibrium.
A solution (id, id, Q) is a canonical belief-invariant equilibrium if there is a belief-invariant
equilibrium (f ,g, Q′) in its equivalence class, i.e., with Q = Q̂′.
The relation between belief-invariant equilibria and their canonical version is clarified in the
following proposition, whose proof is evident and, hence, omitted.
Proposition 7. If (f ,g, Q) is a belief-invariant equilibrium and Q̂ its canonical representative,
then (id, id, Q̂) is also a belief-invariant equilibrium, with the same payoffs as the original
equilibrium.
In a caveat to the above proposition, we stress that the equivalence class of a canonical
belief-invariant equilibrium (id, id, Q) may contain also solutions involving non-belief-invariant
correlations. Indeed, the correlating device could provide players with information about other
players even if this information is useless with respect to the choice of the strategy to play.
Below we discuss an example showing how this can occur.
Finally, observe that the canonical belief-invariant equilibria of a given game G, denoted
B.I.(G), form a convex set, like the canonical communication equilibria:
Proposition 8. If (id, id, Q1) and (id, id, Q2) are canonical belief-invariant equilibria for the
same game, then so is (id, id, Q), with Q = pQ1 + (1− p)Q2 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Proof. Just notice that Q′ as defined in the proof of Proposition 5 is belief-invariant.
An example. Consider again the CHSH game described above. Recall the canonical communi-
cation equilibrium Q previously described, i.e. Q(00 | t1 · t2 = 0) = 1 and Q(01 | t1 · t2 = 1) = 1.
It is easy to see that this equilibrium is not belief-invariant. Indeed, whenever the second player
receives advice 1, his belief about the type of the first player changes, since he knows for sure
that it is 1.
Still, there is a canonical belief-invariant equilibrium. Consider, indeed, the following corre-
lation Q′: Q′(00 | t1 ·t2 = 0) = Q
′(11 | t1 ·t2 = 0) = 1/2 and Q
′(01 | t1 ·t2 = 1) = Q
′(10 | t1 ·t2 =
1) = 1/2. Note that each player receives a payoff of 1 and, thus, there is no way for them to
improve their utility. Anyway, each player receives advice a with probability 1/2 regardless of
the other player’s type. Hence, this correlation does not allow players to gain any information
about other players.
We note that there are multiple equilibria that belong to the equivalence class whose canon-
ical representative is Q′. In some of these equilibria the advice received by players can contain
information that does not serve to the player for computing the action, but still reveal informa-
tion about the other player’s type. Consider for example the following correlation: Q(00, 00 |
r1·r2 = 0) = Q(10, 10 | r1·r2 = 0) = 1/2 and Q(01, 11 | r1·r2 = 1) = Q(11, 01 | r1·r2 = 1) = 1/2,
in which the advice not only suggests the action that the player should take, but also reveal
which game the players are actually playing, and thus, which is the type of the other player.
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3.3 Correlated equilibrium
We obtain the subclass of correlated equilibria by requiring that the correlation used at the
equilibrium is essentially a shared random variable.
Definition 9 (Correlated equilibrium). A solution (f ,g, Q) is called correlated if the output
distribution of Q is independent of the input: Q(s | r) = Q(s) for all r and s. If it is a
communication equilibrium, we speak of a correlated (communication) equilibrium.
Similarly to the belief-invariant case, we transfer the property of being correlated to the
canonical representative Q̂, and we call a canonical correlation Q a canonical correlated equi-
librium if there is any correlated equilibrium (f ,g, Q′) in its equivalence class, i.e., Q = Q̂′.
The set of canonical correlated equilibria of the game G is denoted Corr(G).
Our definition is equivalent to the one of Forges (see [For82] and [For93, page 8]), who de-
scribes the correlated equilibrium as a collection
(
Q(s), g1, . . . , gn
)
, where Q is a distribution of
suggestions independent of the types, and each gi : Ti×Si → Ai is a function that player i uses
to determine their action. Indeed, note that the functions fi in a correlated solution serve no
purpose, since the input ri = fi(ti) to Q is irrelevant, and only the sampled output si and its cor-
relation with s−i matter. Hence, from now on we will denote a correlated solution/equilibrium
simply as (g, Q), with a probability distribution Q on S.
This also allows us to exhibit a simplified equilibrium criterion.
Proposition 10. A tuple (g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium if and only if for all i, ti, si and ai,∑
t−i,s−i
P (t)Q(s)vi(t,g(t, s)) ≥
∑
t−i,s−i
P (t)Q(s)vi(t, aig−i(t−i, s−i)).
Remark 11. If (g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium, then its canonical correlation Q̂ is local in the
sense of (5). Be aware, however, that we do not know if (id, id, Q̂) is a correlated equilibrium,
because it may not have the required property that Q̂(a | t) is independent of t (in contrast to
Proposition 7 in the belief-invariant case).
Worse, even if (id, id, Q) is a communication equilibrium such that Q is a local correlation,
it is not clear whether this implies that Q̂ is a canonical correlated equilibrium in the sense of
Definition 9. To show this, one would have to find a correlated equilibrium (g, Q′) such that
Q = Q̂′ is its canonical representative. The difficulty stems from the fact that while Q can be
simulated by giving a suitable shared randomness Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) to cooperating players, see
eq. (5), to competing players it might give an advantage over the others having access to Γ
directly rather than only Q.
To have a usable handle on correlated equilibria, we propose the following definition, which
allows us to identify the correlated solutions to a game of incomplete information with the
correlated strategies of the associated game of complete information.
Definition 12. We say that a correlated solution (equilibrium) (g, Q) is in standard form if
for all i, the advice space equals the set of functions from types to actions, Si = A
Ti
i , and if the
function gi consists of evaluating the first argument (a function) on the second argument:
gi : Ti ×A
Ti
i −→ Ai,
(ti, σi) 7−→ σi(ti).
Clearly, such a solution is given entirely by the distribution Q on AT11 ×· · ·×A
Tn
n , which we will
thus use as a shorthand for a correlated solution in standard form.
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The following proposition shows that the correlated equilibria in games with incomplete
information, or more specifically their standard form, are precisely the correlated equilibria in
the associated game of complete information that has the strategy space Si = A
Ti
i for player i.
The proof is evident and, hence, omitted.
Proposition 13. If (g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium, then we can obtain a correlated equilib-
rium Q˜ in standard form that is in the same equivalence class, as follows:
Q˜(σ) := Pr
Q
{
∀i gi(·, si) = σi
}
.
Thus, a canonical equilibrium Q is a correlated equilibrium if and only if there exists a correlated
equilibrium in standard form in its equivalence class.
Remark 14. Note that we can also define Nash equilibria in this formalism. Nash equilibria are
precisely the correlated equilibria (g, Q) with a product distribution Q(s) = Q1(s1) · · ·Qn(sn).
Note that it is straightforward to see that if (g, Q) is a Nash equilibrium, then the canonical
representative is also a product distribution, i.e., Q̂ = Q̂1 × · · · × Q̂n, and in fact a Nash
equilibrium. Conversely, if Q(a | t) is a canonical communication equilibrium that factorizes,
i.e., Q(a | t) = Q1(a1 | t1) · · ·Qn(an | tn), then there is a Nash equilibrium in its equivalence
class with the same payoffs. This is obtained by writing each of the local transition probabilities
Qi(ai | ti) as probabilistic mixtures of functions in A
Ti
i .
Thus, in the spirit of previous definitions, we can speak of a canonical Nash equilibrium as a
factorizing canonical communication equilibrium Q(a | t). We will denote the set of canonical
Nash equilibria of a game G as Nash(G).
As expected, and as it should be, the set of correlated equilibria is convex:
Proposition 15. If (g(1), Q1) and (g
(2), Q2) are correlated equilibria for the same game, with
Qj a distribution on S
(j) and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, then so is (g, Q) with
Q(s,b) :=


pQ1(s) if b1 = . . . = bn = 0, s ∈ S
(1),
(1− p)Q2(s) if b1 = . . . = bn = 1, s ∈ S
(2),
0 otherwise;
gi(si, bi) := g
(bi+1)(si).
Proof. The proof follows from the insight that (g, Q) gives each player the information which of
the two solutions (g(1), Q1) and (g
(2), Q2) was implemented, so any benefit from deviating from
the advice for player i would imply an advantage for the player in one of (g(1), Q1) or (g
(2), Q2),
contradicting the assumption that they are equilibria.
An example. Consider again the CHSH game defined above. It is easy to check that the
belief-invariant equilibrium described above is not correlated. Indeed, a shared random variable
is not sufficient to understand which game players are actually playing and to understand if
they need to coordinate or to anti-coordinate.
An example of correlated equilibrium for this game is (id, Q) with Q(00) = Q(11) = 1/2.
Here, the action of each player does not depend on the other player’s type. Anyway, it is
still convenient for the player to follow the suggestion, since they will receive payoff 1 with
probability 3/4 and there is no alternative action that allows them to receive this payoff with
larger probability. Observe that this equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium, since it requires
shared randomness and cannot be factorized. A Nash equilibrium with the same payoff is
(id, Q) with Q(00) = 1.
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3.4 General properties of the equilibrium classes
The main goal of this work is to highlight the relations between the different concepts of equi-
libria we have introduced so far. In particular, in Section 4, we will compare the performance
of these equilibria with respect to social welfare maximization. Here, we begin by pointing out
common and distinguishing features of the classes.
We have observed that there are correlated equilibria that are not Nash, belief-invariant
equilibria that are not correlated, and communication equilibria that are not belief-invariant.
Since communication, belief-invariant and correlated equilibria have convexity properties, we
can arrange the canonical versions of these equilibria into nested sets within the set of canonical
correlations Q(a | t):
Nash(G) ⊂ conv
(
Nash(G)
)
⊂ Corr(G) ⊂ B.I.(G) ⊂ Comm(G), (9)
where conv
(
Nash(G)
)
denotes the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria for G.
Actually, this inclusion can be easily derived from the similar structure existing between the
different classes of correlation resources behind these equilibrium concepts.
Indeed, by our previous observations, Corr(G) is always a convex subset of the local corre-
lations LOC(A | T ), B.I.(G) is a convex subset of the non-signalling correlations BINV(A | T ),
and all are contained in the set of all correlations ALL(A | T ). The inclusion structure between
these classes is known (see, e.g., [MAG06]) for full-coordination games1.
We go on to discuss some further issue arising with these definitions.
Necessity of an informed mediator. The correlated equilibrium class does not need an
informed mediator to be implemented, since it is based on local correlations and the shared
random variables are independent of the types. For some cases the players can also get rid of
the mediator completely, and base their strategy on the observation of a single independent
shared random variable, such as meteorological data. This however suggests that all players
receive the same information as advice. There are examples of correlated equilibria where this
is not given and indeed not possible, such as the game of Chicken [RC66]. Different schemes to
get rid of a mediator based on communication between players have been studied in [For88].
In contrast, in the case of belief-invariant and communication equilibria, the players seem
to need a trusted mediator to implement the correlation. We say “seem” because strong exper-
imental evidence from physics suggests that it is possible to go beyond the local correlations
without a mediator by using quantum effects. However quantum mechanics cannot cover the
whole class of belief-invariant correlations. The correlation (10) given below is not achievable
in quantum mechanics without a mediator (as proven in [Tsi80]). Therefore, unless quantum
mechanics is falsified in the future and replaced by another theory, a mediator is needed to
implement the complete belief-invariant class. The quantum mechanical class will be discussed
later in Section 6.
Privacy of the players. Clearly, in order to implement a correlated equilibrium, nobody
else other than player i needs to learn the type ti. The belief-invariant class allows for more
correlations at the expense that a trusted mediator might learn something about the types.
The use of a belief-invariant correlation guarantees however that the mediator will be the only
1In quantum physics and computer science, these games are known as non-local games. While they may
seem uninteresting because of the lack of competition, they are a wonderful way of reasoning about the classes
of correlations. The objective of a non-local game, in our parlance here, is to find an optimal equilibrium
with respect to a certain payoff function v(t,a) common to all players, which simply boils down to optimizing
〈v〉 =
∑
t,a
P (t)Q(a | t)v(t, a) over all canonical solutions Q from a given class.
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one learning the types and no player j will learn ti. It is not always possible to respect this
requirement in the more general class of communication equilibria.
Note that our concept of privacy in correlated and belief-invariant equilibria is much stronger
than the well-known concept of differential privacy [PR13]. Indeed, we say that an equilibrium
is private in an information-theoretic sense and assume that each player cannot obtain any
new information about the other players while playing the game; differential privacy, instead,
assumes only that each player cannot obtain more than epsilon information, for small and
positive epsilon. Moreover, differential privacy usually guarantees privacy only when the number
of players is large, while our privacy concept applies to any number of players.
Situations in which communication or correlation are useless. If our game G is really
one of complete information in the sense that the types of the players are deterministically
prescribed, i.e., P (t0) = 1 for some t0 ∈ T , then any communication equilibrium is equivalent
to a correlated equilibrium. More precisely, for the canonical form Q of the communication
equilibrium, Q0 := Q(· | t0) as a probability distribution on A = A1 × · · · × An is a correlated
equilibrium, which has the same expected payoffs,
〈vi〉 =
∑
t,a
P (t)Q(a | t)vi(t,a) =
∑
a
Q(a | t0)vi(t0,a) =
∑
a
Q0(a)vi(t0,a),
and similarly for any social payoffs. This reproduces the result of Zhang [Zha12], that quantum
(and indeed any) correlation doesn’t change the landscape of equilibria in games of complete
information beyond correlated equilibria.
Secondly, we can identify a simple class of games where the presence of no additional cor-
relation changes the set of equilibrium payoffs; we call them (two-player) constant sum games,
and they are characterized by the property that
v1(t1t2, a1a2) + v2(t1t2, a1a2) = s(t1t2),
i.e., the sum of the two players’ individual payoffs depends only on the type. This implies that
regardless of the solution employed,
〈v1〉+ 〈v2〉 =
∑
t1t2
P (t1t2)s(t1t2) =: 〈s〉.
Thus, the game is an instance of a zero-sum game according to the theory of von Neumann and
Morgenstern [vNM44] (we can make the sum of payoffs explicitly equal to zero by subtracting
s(t1t2) from v1(t1t2, a1a2), but we refrain from doing so not to overload notation).
This means that there exists a (mixed) strategy QvNMi (ai | ti) for player i, which guarantees
him a payoff vvNMi regardless of what the other player does, and v
vNM
1 + v
vNM
2 = 〈s〉. In
particular, if we consider any communication equilibrium of the game, then the first player’s
payoff cannot increase if the second player were to use his von-Neumann-Morgenstern strategy
(ignoring the advice) that guarantees him a payoff of at least vvNM2 . Thus,
〈v1〉 ≤ 〈s〉 − v
vNM
2 = v
vNM
1 ,
and symmetrically
〈v2〉 ≤ 〈s〉 − v
vNM
1 = v
vNM
2 .
This explains the absence of quantum advantage in the conflict-of-interest games considered
in [BL13], as they are all of the above constant-sum type.
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Computational complexity The equilibrium concept and its variations discussed so far are
useful to understand the behaviour of the players. A fundamental question (see for example
[PR08]) is how one could calculate such an equilibrium or even just verify that a given set of
strategies is an equilibrium, or on the other hand find an equilibrium that optimizes some other
parameter, such as a social payoff. Not that much is known for the class of equilibria we just
discussed. Below we mention the results we are aware of, and we leave as an interesting open
problem to complete the picture. Note that, except where otherwise specified, the computational
complexity will be with respect to the size of the n-player game specification, that consists of a
list of probabilities P (t), for t ∈ T , and a list of the payoff function values vi(t,a), one for each
player i = 1, . . . , n, each t ∈ T , and each a ∈ A.2
Nash equilibria of complete information games are hard to find: in fact, it is known
that the problem is PPAD-hard even for two-player games [DGP09, CDT09]. Since games of
incomplete information contain complete-information games as a special case, they are at least
as hard. On the other hand, from Proposition 2, it turns out that it is possible to check in
polynomial time whether a solution (id, id, Q) in canonical form is a Nash equilibrium whenever
the number of actions available to players is bounded.
Correlated equilibria of complete information games can be found in time that is poly-
nomial in the size of the game specification through linear programming [HS89]. Recall that
a game of incomplete information can be modelled as a game of complete information where
the players’ strategies are ATii = {gi : Ti → Ai}, i.e., all possible functions from Ti to Ai. How-
ever, this not only disregards the special nature of the payoff functions that depend only on
input-output pairs of the strategy, but exponentially increases the size of the game specifica-
tion. Thus, the above result does not extend, and thus we do not know whether it is possible to
find correlated equilibria in polynomial time. This result extends also to games of incomplete
information.
Still, optimal correlated equilibria of incomplete information games are hard to find (they
belong to the complexity class of NP-hard problems) even for full coordination games, with
respect to the size of the game specification. This can be proven by embedding notoriously
hard problems (like the chromatic number of a graph) into cooperative games (see, for example,
the game used in [CMN+07].
Belief-invariant equilibria of full coordination games of incomplete information can be
instead found in time that is polynomial in the size of game description via linear programming.
This is because the set of non-signalling correlations is defined by polynomially many non-
negative variables subject to polynomially many linear inequalities. (See, for example, the LP
in [BFS14, page 8].) We do not know yet if this extends to conflict of interest games, and this is
one of the major open problems in the present theory. Our intuition is that the belief-invariant
equilibria of games of incomplete information are the “right” analogue of correlated equilibria of
games of complete information; from this perspective one might speculate that belief-invariant
equilibria can be found efficiently, such as [HS89].
4 Impact of correlation on social welfare
In this section we show that no-signalling correlation can have a positive impact on the social
welfare of a game. Specifically, there are games in which a belief-invariant equilibrium can
2Note that the size of the game specification is exponential in the number of players. For this reason, many
computational complexity results have been given only for games that are succinctly representable, that is games
that can be fully specified by a number of parameters that is polynomial in the number of players, types and
actions.
15
achieve a social welfare that is better than every correlated equilibria. The CHSH game dis-
cussed above gives us a clear example of this fact: indeed, we showed there is a belief-invariant
equilibrium that achieves an expected social welfare of 2, whereas it is not hard to see that no
correlated equilibrium is better that the one described above, whose social welfare is 3/2.
However, the CHSH game is a two-player full coordination game, and one can wonder whether
such a result holds even we consider games with conflict of interests and/or with more than two
player. Pappa et al. [PKL+15] give a partial answer to this question, by showing that above
result holds for a two-player conflict-of-interest variant of the CHSH game. Below, we report
this result for completeness. Moreover, we extend their result by presenting a n-player game
with conflict of interests in which a belief-invariant equilibrium exists that is better than any
correlated equilibrium. Interestingly, our game is a variant of the GHZ game, a game motivated
from quantum mechanics [GHSZ90].
Since the class of belief-invariant equilibria strictly contains the class of correlated equilibria,
it may be expected that the former contains equilibria that are better than the ones in the latter
class. It is instead surprising that a correlated equilibrium can perform better than any other
equilibrium in the class, even unrestricted ones. However, we next show that this may be
the case. In other word, we prove that locality is not only a desirable requirement, but it is
sometimes necessary in order to achieve high social welfare. Note that, recently a general form
of Pappa et al. game has been studied where authors have shown quantum advantage in the
context of social welfare [RMG+16].
4.1 Belief-invariant equilibria can outperform correlated equilibria
4.1.1 Two-player games with conflict of interests
A modified version of CHSH has been used in [PKL+15] to obtain a two-player game with conflict
of interests in which there is a belief-invariant equilibrium that achieves a better expected social
welfare than any correlated equilibrium. We report it here for completeness.
In this game, the players are still interested in coordinating or anti-coordinating as in CHSH,
but now each player prefers a specific outcome, as follows:
0 1
0 1,12 0,0
1 0,0 12 ,1
t1 · t2 = 0
0 1
0 0,0 34 ,
3
4
1 34 ,
3
4 0,0
t1 · t2 = 1
Figure 2: The game of Pappa et al. [PKL+15]
The pure strategies (0, 0) and (1, 1) lead to two equilibria with unfair expected payoffs, in
a battle-of-sexes flavour.3 No player has incentive to deviate from constant actions (0, 0), but
the fist player has 34 expected payoff, while the other player has
3
8 . For the second equilibrium,
constant (1, 1), we have the same unfairness, this time in favor of the second player.
The situation can be improved with the notions of communication equilibria we discussed in
Section 3. With a correlated equilibrium we have a solution similar to battle-of-sexes: with one
bit shared randomness one can select either the first or the second pure equilibrium uniformly.
This makes the situation fair, with an expected payoff of 916 . There are also an unfair correlated
equilibria where the two players get payoff of 1116 and
7
16 , respectively. However, the following
3Battle of Sexes is a classic game theory example. It is used in many textbooks, for example [FT91, NRTV07].
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belief-invariant correlation guarantees to both players a fair and optimal expected payoff of 34 .
If t1 · t2 = 0 then Q(0, 0 | t) = Q(1, 1 | t) =
1
2
,
if t1 · t2 = 1 then Q(0, 1 | t) = Q(1, 0 | t) =
1
2
.
(10)
This is belief-invariant because the marginal of each player is a uniformly random bit whatever
the other player’s type is. Notice that this correlation solves perfectly the common objective of
CHSH, i.e., coordinating if t1 · t2 = 0 and anti-coordinating otherwise. Also, in the case t1 · t2 = 0
it behaves like a correlated equilibrium in the battle-of-sexes game, by selecting one of the two
pure strategies (1, 1) or (0, 0) uniformly.
As said above, this correlation is used in [For06, page 335], and it is well-known in the
physics community as the PR-box [PR94]. It is also known that this belief-invariant correlation
cannot be implemented as a local one [Tsi80].
4.1.2 n-player games with conflict of interests
We now introduce a game based on an example in physics known as the GHZ state for three
parties [GHSZ90]. (The result can be generalized to n parties, we chose n = 3 for simplicity.)
We have three players, each one with two possible types (which we label type 0 and 1) and
two possible actions (action 0 and 1). The possible type triples (t1, t2, t3) are taken from the
set {(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)} with probability
p(0, 0, 1) = p(0, 1, 0) = p(1, 0, 0) =
1
6
, p(1, 1, 1) =
1
2
.
Let τ = t1 · t2 · t3. We have Pr(τ = 1) = Pr(τ = 0) =
1
2 . The payoff are as follows:
0 1
0 ε,ε,ε 0,0,0
1 0,0,0 ε,1,1
0
0 1
0 0,0,0 1,ε,1
1 1,1,ε 0,0,0
1
(a) τ = 0
0 1
0 0,0,0 1,1,ε
1 1,ε,1 0,0,0
0
0 1
0 ε,1,1 0,0,0
1 0,0,0 ε,ε,ε
1
(b) τ = 1
Figure 3: A modified GHZ game. The subgame (a) is played when τ = 0 and subgame (b)
when τ = 1. In both cases the strategy player 1 identify the table (0 for right table, 1 for
the left table), the strategy of player 2 chooses the row (0 for the top row, 1 for the bottom
row), and the strategy of player 3 chooses the column (0 for left column, 1 for right column).
Within a cell, the first value is the payoff of player 1, the second value is the payoff of player
2 and the last payoff is for player 3.
Thus, the players jointly lose the game (have all payoff 0) whenever τ 6= a1+a2+a3 mod 2.
In the non-losing cases, the players whose action is equal to τ receive payoff ε (a positive number
very close to 0), while the others receive payoff 1.
Therefore this game, in the spirit of [PKL+15], features both coordination and conflicting
interests. The players are jointly interested in minimizing the probability of having payoff 0,
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while each player individually dislikes to be the one implementing the action τ in the winning
cases.
In the best correlated equilibrium (in terms of expected payoff for each player), the mediator
suggests to each player i the function
σi = 1− ti mod 2.
This always wins in the case τ = 0 and loses in the case τ = 1. It gives to each player expected
payoff 2+ε6 .
The best communication equilibrium is as follows. The mediator learns the types, and
if τ = 0 he suggests actions (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0) uniformly at random, while if τ = 1
he suggests actions (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0) uniformly at random. This gives to each player
expected payoff 2+ε3 .
This communication equilibrium is not belief-invariant, because the marginals for the play-
ers’ actions are not the same in case τ = 0 and τ = 1. For example, if a player has type 1 and
receives advice for action 0, then his belief will change, assigning more probability to the case
τ = 1.
Thus, in any belief-invariant equilibria, the mediator must make sure that, for all the possible
triples of types, the marginal distributions of all players are the same. Since the payoff of
player i is maximized when the action ai 6= τ , the expected social welfare for a belief-invariant
equilibrium is maximized by considering a distribution Q such that the i-th marginal gives
PrQ,t(ai = 1 | ti) = PrQ,t(ai = 0 | ti) =
1
2 , whatever the type ti is. This is implemented by the
following distribution Q:
If t ∈ {(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0)} then
Q(0, 0, 0 | t) = Q(0, 1, 1 | t) = Q(1, 0, 1 | t) = Q(1, 1, 0 | t) =
1
4
,
if t = (1, 1, 1) then
Q(0, 0, 1 | t) = Q(0, 1, 0 | t) = Q(1, 0, 0 | t) = Q(1, 1, 1 | t) =
1
4
.
(11)
It is easy to see that this is a belief-invariant equilibrium, since any deviating player would
decrease his own expected payoff by deviating (it makes everyone lose in at least a value of τ).
One can check that in this equilibrium each player receives a payoff of 1+ε2 that is better
than the expected payoff of the best correlated equilibrium. There are biased communication
equilibria produced through an unrestricted, non-private, correlation. Such an equilibrium can
have a player’s expected payoff as large as 1.
4.2 Belief-invariant equilibria can outperform non-belief-invariant ones
Consider the following two-player game of incomplete information: the two players with types
t1, t2 ∈ {0, 1}. Each player has also two available actions, also named 0 and 1. The payoffs are
as follows:
0 1
0 1-ε,1-ε 2,0
1 0,2 2-ε,2-ε
t1 · t2 = 0
0 1
0 0,0 1,1
1 1,1 0,0
t1 · t2 = 1
Figure 4: A game in which belief-invariant equilibria outperform non-belief-invariant ones
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Thus, if t1 · t2 = 0, then payoffs resemble the ones of the Prisoners’ Dilemma,
4 so that it
is a dominant strategy for each player to take action 0. If instead t1 · t2 = 1 then players are
playing a full coordination game in which they prefer to take different actions. We assume that
each type profile (t1, t2) has the same probability
1
4 of being generated.
Let us consider a distribution Q of the form Q(a | t). We will show that for any such
distribution, if (id, id, Q) is an equilibrium and maximizes the social welfare among all the
equilibria, then it is a correlated equilibrium, and hence it is belief-invariant. Note that there
is no loss of generality in considering only canonical equilibria. Indeed, as stated above, if a
non-canonical communication equilibrium (f ,g, Q′) exists with a better social welfare, then its
canonical representative (id, id, Q̂′) is still an equilibrium and has the same social welfare as
(f ,g, Q′).
We start by stating conditions for (id, id, Q) being an equilibrium that maximizes the social
welfare. A first simple observation is the following: If Q(1, a2 | 0, t2) > 0, then (id, id, Q) is not
in equilibrium. Indeed, when t1 = 0, then player 1 knows with probability 1 that t1 · t2 = 0,
and thus it is a dominant strategy to take action 0. By symmetry, the same observation holds
by inverting the roles of players. Hence, in order to have a canonical equilibrium we must have
that Q is as follows:
Q(0, 0 | 0, 0) = 1; Q(0, 0 | 0, 1) = 1− p; Q(0, 1 | 0, 1) = p;
Q(0, 0 | 1, 0) = 1− q; Q(1, 0 | 1, 0) = q;
Q(0, 0 | 1, 1) = p00; Q(0, 1 | 1, 1) = p01; Q(1, 0 | 1, 1) = p10; Q(1, 1 | 1, 1) = p11.
(12)
Next lemma states conditions on these values in order for Q being an equilibrium.
Lemma 16. (id, id, Q) is an equilibrium if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
p10 − p11 ≥ (1− ε)q (13)
p01 − p11 ≥ (1− ε)p (14)
p00 − p01 ≤ (1− ε)(1 − q) (15)
p00 − p10 ≤ (1− ε)(1 − p) (16)
(p01 + p10)− (p00 + p11) ≥ (1− ε)(2q − 1) (17)
(p01 + p10)− (p00 + p11) ≥ (1− ε)(2p − 1). (18)
Proof. By Proposition 2, (id, id, Q) is an equilibrium if and only if for every i ∈ {1, 2}, ti ∈
{0, 1}, bi ∈ {0, 1} and any function χi ∈ A
Ti×Ai
i
〈vi | ti〉 :=
∑
t−i,a
P (t−iti)Q(a | t−iti)vi(t,a−iai) ≥
∑
t−i,a
P (t−iti)Q(a | t−ibi)vi(t,a−iχi(ti, ai)).
(19)
As observed above, when ti = 0, (19) easily holds since, whichever the advice is, it is a dominant
strategy for player i to take action 0. Hence, we only need to verify that (19) holds when ti = 1.
To this aim, observe that there are only four possible functions χi(1, ·): the identity function
that sets χi(1, ai) = ai, the two constant functions that set χi(1, ai) = 0 and χi(1, ai) = 1 for
every ai, respectively, and the negation function that sets χi(1, ai) = 1− ai.
4The Prisoners’ Dilemma is another classic example in game theory. It is found in many textbooks, for
example [FT91, NRTV07].
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Thus, if i = 1 and bi = ti = 1, then we require that
〈v1 | 1〉 ≥
∑
t2,a
P (1, t2)Q(a | 1, t2)vi(t, 0a2) =
1− ε+ p01 + p11
2
〈v1 | 1〉 ≥
∑
t2,a
P (1, t2)Q(a | 1, t2)vi(t, 1a2) =
p10 + p00
2
〈v1 | 1〉 ≥
∑
t2,a
P (1, t2)Q(a | 1, t2)vi(t, (1− a1)a2) =
(1− ε)q + p00 + p11
2
.
Similarly, if i = 1 and 0 = bi 6= ti = 1, then we require that
〈v1 | 1〉 ≥
∑
t2,a
P (1, t2)Q(a | 0, t2)vi(t, a1a2) =
1− ε+ p01 + p11
2
〈v1 | 1〉 ≥
∑
t2,a
P (1, t2)Q(a | 0, t2)vi(t, 0a2) =
1− ε+ p01 + p11
2
〈v1 | 1〉 ≥
∑
t2,a
P (1, t2)Q(a | 0, t2)vi(t, 1a2) =
p10 + p00
2
〈v1 | 1〉 ≥
∑
t2,a
P (1, t2)Q(a | 0, t2)vi(t, (1− a1)a2) =
p10 + p00
2
.
Since 〈v1 | 1〉 =
(1−ε)(1−q)+p01+p10
2 , it follows that all these inequalities hold if and only if condi-
tions (13),(15),(17) are satisfied.
By repeating the same argument, we can observe that all the inequalities regarding to the
second player hold if and only if conditions (14),(16),(18) are satisfied.
Let us now consider the correlation Q⋆ that sets p = q = p01 = p10 = 1/2 and p00 = p11 = 0.
It is immediate to check that conditions (13-18) are satisfied, and, hence, (id, id, Q⋆) is an
equilibrium.
Note also that, if ti = 0, then the player i is suggested to take action 0, regardless of the
other player’s type, whereas, if ti = 1, the player i uses a shared random variable to decide
which action they have to take. Thus, the solution (id, id, Q⋆) is equivalent to (g, Q˜⋆), where
Q˜⋆(a | t) = Q˜⋆(a) for each a, and, in particular, sets Q˜⋆(00) = Q˜⋆(11) = 0 and Q˜⋆(01) =
Q˜⋆(10) = 1/2, and γ = (g1, g2), with gi ∈ A
Ti×Ai
i that sets gi(0, ai) = 0 and gi(1, ai) = ai for
each ai ∈ Ai. In other words, (id, id, Q
⋆) is a correlated equilibrium.
Finally, it is easy to check that the expected payoff that each player receives at this equilib-
rium is 1 − ε/2. Thus the expected social welfare of the correlated equilibrium (id, id, Q⋆) is
2− ε.
We next state the main result of this section, namely that for this game any communication
equilibrium achieving an expected social welfare that is at least 2− ε must be correlated.
Theorem 17. Any canonical communication equilibrium (id, id, Q) with expected social welfare
at least 2− ε is correlated.
Proof. Let Q be as in (12). As observed above, any canonical communication equilibrium
(id, id, Q) must be distributed as Q and must satisfy conditions (13-18).
The expected social welfare of a solution (id, id, Q) is
SW(id, id, Q) =
1
4
[2(1 − ε) + (2(1 − ε)(1 − p) + 2p) + (2(1 − ε)(1− q) + 2q) + 2(p01 + p10)]
=
1
2
[3− ε[3− p− q] + (p01 + p10)] .
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Thus, the expected social welfare of (id, id, Q) is at least 2− ε only if
p00 + p11 = 1− p01 − p10 ≤ (p+ q − 1)ε.
However, since p00 + p11 ≥ 0, we have that
p+ q ≥ 1. (20)
Moreover, since p ≤ 1, we also have that
p11 ≤ p00 + p11 ≤ (p + q − 1)ε ≤ qε,
and, similarly, p11 ≤ pε.
Then, for a canonical communication equilibrium (id, id, Q) with social welfare at least
2 − ε, we have, from (13), that p10 ≥ (1 − ε)q + p11 ≥ q, and, from (14), that p01 ≥ p. Thus,
p + q ≤ p01 + p10 ≤ 1. Hence and from (20) we can then conclude that q = 1 − p, p10 = q and
p01 = p.
Therefore in any communication equilibrium (id, id, Q) that achieves welfare at least 2− ε,
the distribution Q is as follows:
Q((0, 0) | (0, 0)) = 1;
Q((0, 0) | (0, 1)) = Q((1, 0) | (1, 0)) = Q((1, 0) | (1, 1)) = 1− p;
Q((0, 1) | (0, 1)) = Q((0, 0) | (1, 0)) = Q((0, 1) | (1, 1)) = p;
whereas all the remaining probabilities are 0.
That is, if ti = 0, then the player i is suggested to take action 0, and, if ti = 1, then the
player i uses a shared random binary variable with distribution (p, 1−p) to decide which action
they have to take. Thus, as above, we can rewrite the equilibrium (id, id, Q) as (g, Q˜), where
Q˜(a | t) = Q˜(a) for each a, and, in particular, sets Q˜(00) = Q˜(11) = 0, Q˜⋆(01) = p and
Q˜⋆(10) = 1− p, and γ = (g1, g2), with gi ∈ A
Ti×Ai
i that sets gi(0, ai) = 0 and gi(1, ai) = ai for
each ai ∈ Ai. In conclusion, (id, id, Q
⋆) is a correlated equilibrium.
We remark that a communication equilibrium that is not correlated exists in this game.
Consider, indeed, the correlation Q′ that sets p = q = 0, p01 = p10 = 1/2 and p00 = p11 = 0.
We have that (id, id, Q′) is an equilibrium since it satisfies (13-18). However, if the type of
player 1 is 1, then she is suggested to take action 0 with a larger probability when t2 = 0 than
when t2 = 1. Thus, (id, id, Q
′) is not belief-invariant, and, as a consequence it is not correlated.
However, as proved above, (id, id, Q′) has an expected social welfare of 2 − 32ε that is lower
than the social welfare of (id, id, Q⋆).
5 Potential applications
In the previous sections we introduced the concepts of correlated and belief-invariant equilibria,
and briefly highlighted some of their properties, mainly with respect to privacy, computational
complexity and social welfare maximization. We saw that very little is known about these
equilibria, and thus these equilibrium concepts can stimulate theoretical research along these
and other directions.
However, our interest in these equilibrium concepts is not only of theoretical nature. Indeed,
it turns out that privacy and high social welfare are desirable properties in many real world
settings. For these setting, implementing a good correlated or a good belief-invariant equilibrium
can help the players to reach better equilibria guaranteeing information-theoretic privacy. We
list below three examples of real-world settings in which the concepts of correlated and belief-
invariant equilibria can be relevant.
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Trade secrets in markets. Suppose two or more companies are in competition for a share
of the market (e.g., Coke and Pepsi, or Microsoft and Apple). Each company is trying to
introduce a new product, and the features of the products are trade secrets. They have an
incentive to cooperate in order to minimize the production costs but, at the same time, they
have an incentive not to cooperate, as the negotiation might expose their secrets. In such a
setting, if there were a trusted third party able to implement a correlated or a belief-invariant
equilibrium, this would not longer be an issue.
Note that this simple example can be generalized to every setting in which players’ payoff
are affected by the ability of “guessing the other players’ types”.
Advertising. A typical setting in which the ability of guessing the other players’ type is of
huge importance is advertising (see, for example, [CLPR15]). In such a setting an advertiser has
a product to advertise, whose absolute quality is unknown to the potential users. The advertiser
can adopt different advertising strategies (e.g., viral advertising, commercials, newspaper ads,
web ads), whose success depends on the features of the subject to which the advertisement
is aimed. On the other side, users would like to receive ads only for high-quality products,
therefore they do not like to reveal their interests.
Hence, as above, it would be useful both for advertiser and for users to correlate their actions,
so that the advertisers would be able to make more successful advertising campaign and the
users could receive more ads for high-quality products than for low-quality ones. However,
because of the privacy issues discussed above, this correlation may be effectively implemented
only if there is a trusted mediator that is able to find a good correlated or belief-invariant
equilibrium.
Coalition formation In coalition formation problems, n players want to arrange coalitions,
i.e., a partition of the set of players. (As a simple example, one can imagine children organizing
the two teams before a friendly football match.) Informally, a coalition formation setting rele-
vant to us is as follows: each player has a list of desirable allies, and communicates to a mediator
a ordered list of preferred subsets of the players in which they would like to be included. The
mediator, then, announces the partition trying to create an equilibrium that maximizes player’s
happiness with the choice. In such a setting, a belief-invariant correlated equilibrium could help
designing solutions where the players’ real preferences are kept secret. For recent developments
on coalition formation, see [GFInG16] and the references therein.
Network congestion. Another example in which correlated and belief-invariant equilibria
may be useful is for network congestion. Suppose that the routes taken by people driving during
rush hours were correlated in some way. (An example could be a GPS device or smartphone
application, on which people select their starting and destination points and receive a suggested
route.) Can this correlation reduce the congestion of the network? As we show next, not only
this is possible, but this correlation can also be implemented privately, so that the suggestion
does not reveal the sources or the destinations of other players. Note that this may be required
in order to avoid privacy leakages.
Specifically, we show an application of belief-invariant equilibria in network congestion games
(aka selfish routing). Here, a network is modelled as a labelled graph G, defined by a set V
of vertices, a set of edges E ⊂ V × V and for each (u, v) ∈ E a cost function cuv : N → R.
A network congestion game goes as follows. Each player is associated with a source and a
target node and they have to decide the route to take. The strategy set for a player contains
all possible paths from source to target, and the utility for a player is minus the sum of the
cost functions in the edges of the chosen path. The edges get “congested” as a function of the
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number of players using them, i.e., if x players choose edge (u, v), then each of them faces cost
cuv(x).
We consider an “incomplete information” version of network congestion games, where the
source-targets are decided by the players’ types. Then, by tweaking the CHSH game we can
exhibit an instance of selfish routing that demonstrate that belief-invariant equilibria can help
reducing the social cost. Our example is illustrated in Figure 5.
s1
s0
d
u
t
x
x
1
1
1/x
1/x
Figure 5: A network congestion game based on CHSH. The edge labels are the cost functions
of the edges, where x is the number of players using that edge.
The game goes as follows: there are two players, with binary types selected uniformly at
random. The source-target pairs are chosen as follows:
• if ti = 0 then Player i starts at vertex s0 and wants to reach t,
• if ti = 1 then Player i starts at vertex s1 and wants to reach t.
The strategies can be summarized in two meaningful choices: from his source point, a player
can decide to go UP towards the vertex u or DOWN towards the vertex d and from there take final
step towards t.
UP DOWN
UP
3
2 ,
3
2 2,2
DOWN 2,2 32 ,
3
2
t1 · t2 = 0
UP DOWN
UP
5
2 ,
5
2
3
2 ,
3
2
DOWN
3
2 ,
3
2
5
2 ,
5
2
t1 · t2 = 1
Figure 6: Cost matrix for the network congestion CHSH game
The cost table is in Figure 6. It is clear from the table that the situation is similar to Figure 1.
Players with pure strategies can reach an equilibrium by choosing (UP, UP) or (DOWN, DOWN)
regardless of their types, and have an expected cost of 34 ·
3
2 +
1
4 · 2 =
13
8 . A belief-invariant
correlation as in (10) gives an equilibrium with expected cost of 32 ..
Note that one can introduce conflict of interest into the game above by modifying the network
in Figure 5 as illustrated in Figure 7.
In this graph, whatever the types are, always assign Player 1 to target t′ and Player 2 to
target t′′. Now the fist player will prefer the strategy UP and the second player will prefer the
strategy DOWN, in a situation similar to the game in Figure 2.
6 Quantum equilibria
In this section we define the class of quantum correlated solutions and equilibria of games,
which is a physically motivated subclass of belief-invariant solutions and equilibria. This class
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s1
s0
d
u
t′
t′′
x
x
1
1 1/x
1/x
ε
Figure 7: A network congestion game based on CHSH. The edge labels are the cost functions
of the edges, where x is the number of players using that edge.
is interesting because it allows us to go beyond the local correlations without the need of an
informed trusted mediator. Rather, like the correlated equilibria, it only requires the (still
trusted) distribution of a prior shared resource: a quantum state. To make use of it, the players
need the capability to store this quantum information, and to make measurements on it at will,
according to their type. The measurement result then informs their action.
6.1 Quantum formalism
In the interest of being self-contained, we briefly present the mathematical formalism necessary
to introduce and discuss quantum correlated equilibria. (For more details, see [NC00, Wil13].)
Mathematically, a state is given by a density operator ρ acting on a complex Hilbert space
H, which means that ρ is positive semidefinite, ρ ≥ 0, and has unit trace, Tr(ρ) = 1. Every
density operator can occur as the state of a system.
A measurement on the quantum system with Hilbert space H is given by a resolution of
the identity, or positive operator valued measure (POVM), which is a collection (Ms : s ∈ S) of
positive semidefinite matrices Ms ≥ 0, one for each possible outcome s ∈ S of the measurement,
acting on Hi and such that
∑
sMs = 1 . Every resolution of the identity can be realized in a
quantum mechanical experiment.
States and measurements are the way quantum theory encodes the observable features of
physical systems. The fundamental formula is Born’s rule, which determines the probability of
observing an outcome:
Pr{s | ρ} = Tr ρMs. (21)
The above-mentioned rules for states and measurements make sure that these numbers are
always nonnegative, and add up to 1 for each state and each measurement. This formalism
includes classical probability theory, by restricting to diagonal states ρ and measurement oper-
ators Ms (in some fixed, “computational” orthonormal basis {|x〉}):
ρ =
∑
x
rx|x〉〈x|,
Ms =
∑
x
µs(x)|x〉〈x|,
where |x〉〈x| denotes the projector onto the line C|x〉. In his case, the conditions for a state
are equivalent to rx ≥ 0 and
∑
x rx = 1, i.e., (rx)x is a probability vector; the conditions for a
measurement reduce to
∑
s µs(x) = 1 for all x, i.e., [µs(x)]s,x is a stochastic matrix.
Note that for simplicity, we assume the discrete setting here: the Hilbert spaces are all finite
dimensional and the measurements have discrete sets of outcomes.
In our multi-player games, we associate a Hilbert space Hi to each player’s quantum system,
while their joint quantum system is described by the tensor product Hilbert space H = H1 ⊗
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· · · ⊗ Hn. If each player has a measurement M
i = (M isi : si ∈ Si) acting on Hi, we associate to
them a joint measurement M1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mn =
(
Ms : s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
)
acting on H:
M(s1,...,sn) =M
1
s1
⊗ · · · ⊗Mnsn .
Then, for a state ρ acting on the composite Hilbert space H,
Pr{s = (s1, . . . , sn) | ρ} = Tr ρ(M
1
s1
⊗ · · · ⊗Mnsn).
To make the link with the correlations discussed in the previous sections, consider the
situation that every player i has access to several measurements M ri , ri ∈ Ri, for simplicity all
with outcomes in a set Si, which however could be specific to the player. Now, given a state
ρ and the measurements M ri , the probability of outputs s1, . . . , sn given the players’ inputs
r1, . . . , rn is
Q(s1, . . . , sn | r1, . . . , rn) = Tr ρ(M
r1
s1
⊗ · · · ⊗M rnsn ). (22)
This is evidently a correlation, and the correlations that can be written in the above form, with
a suitable state and suitable measurements, are called quantum correlations, their set denoted
Q(S | R). (See, for example, the definition in the survey [Pal15].)
Fact 18 (Belief-invariance of quantum correlations). The correlation Q obtained as in eq. (22)
is always belief-invariant.
Proof. Let I and J = N \ I be a partition of N . Recall that for all j and rj ∈ Rj we have∑
sj
M
rj
sj = 1 . Thus, for all sI ∈ SI , rI ∈ RI , rJ , r
′
J ∈ RJ ,
∑
sJ∈SJ
q(sI , sJ | rI , rJ ) =
∑
sJ∈SJ
Tr ρ

⊗
i∈I
M risi ⊗
⊗
j∈J
M
rj
sj


= Tr ρ

⊗
i∈I
M risi ⊗
⊗
j∈J
1


=
∑
sJ∈SJ
Tr ρ

⊗
i∈I
M risi ⊗
⊗
j∈J
M
r′j
sj


=
∑
sJ∈SJ
q(sI , sJ | rI , r
′
J),
and we are done.
Remark 19. Any local correlation Q,
Q(s | r) =
∑
γ
V (γ)L1(s1 | r1γ1) · · ·Ln(sn | rnγn),
can be obtained in the form (22), with a suitable state and measurement. Namely,
ρ =
∑
γ
V (γ)|γ1〉〈γ1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |γn〉〈γn|,
and
M risi =
∑
γi
Li(si | riγi)|γi〉〈γi|.
Thus we have,
LOC(S | R) ⊂ Q(S | R) ⊂ BINV(S | R).
Bell [Bel64] and Tsilerson [Tsi80] prove that the above inclusions are strict.
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6.2 Quantum solutions and quantum correlated equilibria
We are now ready to give the definition of a quantum correlated equilibrium. To start, a
quantum solution for a game consists of local measurements M ti = (M tiai : ai ∈ Ai) for player i,
ti ∈ Ti, on a suitable local Hilbert space Hi, and a state ρ on H = H1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hn. This defines
a correlation in canonical form,
Q(a | t) = Tr ρ(M t1a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
tn
an), (23)
and hence expected payoffs for the players,
〈vi〉 =
∑
t,a
P (t)Tr ρ(M t1a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
tn
an)vi(t,a).
In strategic form, the “quantum correlated” canonical game goes as follows. A mediator, who
does not know the players’ types, has a correlation device that produces the state ρ. The players
trust the mediator in using such device correctly. He sends to each player i the corresponding
part of the state in the space Hi. He also suggests the measurements {M
ti : ti ∈ Ti} to use as
a strategy. Note that there is no need for the players to reveal their types to the mediator, just
as in the case of correlated solutions.
The definition of equilibrium is basically the same as before; we want to capture the idea
that no player has an incentive to deviate from the advice unilaterally.
Definition 20 (Quantum correlated equilibrium). A quantum solution (M t, ρ) is a quantum
correlated equilibrium, if and only if for all players i and any measurements N ti = (N tiai : ai ∈
Ai),
〈vi〉 =
∑
t,a
P (t)Tr ρ(M t1a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
tn
an
)vi(t,a)
≥
∑
t,a
P (t)Tr ρ(M t1a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
ti−1
ai−1 ⊗N
ti
ai
⊗M
ti+1
ai+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
tn
an
)vi(t,a).
Under the same philosophy as in the sections on belief-invariant and correlated equilibria, we
then call the canonical solution Q as in eq. (23) a canonical quantum correlated equilibrium,
the set of which is denoted Quantum(G).
The following proposition simplifies the equilibrium condition by looking at one ti at a time,
in the spirit of Proposition 10. The proof is evident and, hence, omitted.
Proposition 21. A quantum solution (M t, ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium, if and only
if for all players i, types ti, and any measurement N
ti = (N tiai : ai ∈ Ai),
〈vi〉 =
∑
t−i,a
P (t)Tr ρ(M t1a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
tn
an)vi(t,a)
≥
∑
t−i,a
P (t)Tr ρ(M t1a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
ti−1
ai−1 ⊗N
ti
ai
⊗M
ti+1
ai+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
tn
an)vi(t,a).
Remark 22. Verifying that (M t, ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium can be done via
semidefinite programming. As argued in [PKL+15], and formalized in the above Proposition 21,
one can fix the other players’ strategies and check that for each type ti the optimal strategy of
player i is M ti . Since this must be done for each type profile, the running time is polynomial
in the size of the game description (or rather the description of the supposed equilibrium), but
not of the game parameters.
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It may seem as if we have left the formalism of communication and belief-invariant developed
in the previous section, and of course that is necessarily the case since we want to talk about
quantum correlations. It is however possible, although at a price, to present quantum solutions
and quantum correlated equilibria in that general framework. Note that in Definition 20 above
we have to consider any one player varying their measurement. Thus, define Ri :=M(Hi, Ai) to
be the set of all possible measurements on Hi with outcomes in Ai; this is of course an infinite
set, in fact it has the structure of a manifold, but let us not worry about that. In this way,
each ri ∈ Ri specifies precisely a measurement and each possible measurement is represented.
Denote this (very big) correlation Q(a | r).
Proposition 23. A quantum solution (Mr, ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium if and only
if (f , id,Q) is a (belief-invariant) communication equilibrium, where fi(ti) = ri := M
ti ∈ Ri is
defined uniquely by the requirement that ri labels the measurement used in the quantum solution.
Furthermore, the canonical forms coincide: Q̂ = Q.
Proof. By definition.
The class of quantum correlated equilibria contains the correlated equilibria of Definition 9
as a special case:
Proposition 24. Every correlated equilibrium is a quantum correlated equilibrium. Indeed, if
(g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium, and we define the state ρ and measurements M ti = (M tiai :
ai ∈ Ai) as in Remark 19:
ρ =
∑
s
Q(s)|s1〉〈s1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |sn〉〈sn|,
M tiai =
∑
si
δgi(ti,si),ai |si〉〈si|,
where δ is the Kronecker delta function, then (Mr, ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium which
has the same canonical representative Q̂ as (g, Q); in particular they have the same payoffs.
Proof. The state ρ is a mixture of classical advice. For all i, ti every measurement can also be
simulated classically, and locally, with the use of private randomness. Since (g, Q) is a correlated
equilibrium, no deviation from the suggested measurement can be beneficial to any player. This
shows that (Mr, ρ) is an equilibrium, and by (23) one can verify that its canonical is Qˆ.
Discussion and historical background. From the definition and the observations made
above, it follows that when comparing equilibrium classes at the level of their canonical repre-
sentatives, quantum correlated equilibria are sandwiched between correlated and belief-invariant
ones:
Corr(G) ⊂ Quantum(G) ⊂ B.I.(G).
There are games where the inclusions are strict. A famous one is the CHSH game, which we have
used extensively as an example throughout this paper. This is a non-local game, therefore a
full coordination Bayesian game. It follows from [CHSH69] that there is a quantum equilibrium
which is not in Corr(CHSH), and [Tsi80] proved that the belief-invariant equilibrium given by
(10) is not in Quantum(CHSH). Both results, though elementary mathematically, constituted
breakthroughs in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
The study of quantum correlations appears in many works in physics and computer science
(see, for example, the surveys [AMO08, Pal15] and the references therein). On the other hand,
there have been several approaches for the use of quantum correlations in game theory (as
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illustrated extensively in the survey [GZK08]). The general connection with Bayesian games
has been made explicit in works like [LM05, BL13, PKL+15]. In particular, [LM05, PKL+15]
figured out that there could be a quantum advantage even in the case of conflicting interest,
i.e., non full-coordination games. Below we show that the result in [PKL+15] can be extended
to n players.
Remark 25 (About physical realization). Let us conclude this discussion with few words
on privacy. The class of quantum correlations can be completely realized only with the use
of quantum information processing. Such technology is developing rapidly and it is already
available to experimental physicists, as reported in [PKL+15].
Physicists often imagine ideal devices called “non-signalling boxes” that implement all the
class of belief-invariant correlations without revealing the types to a mediator. However, quan-
tum mechanics is the best-known theory to describe our reality, and there is no known super-
quantum theory that allows the existence of the non-signalling boxes. Therefore, to the best of
our knowledge of nature, the quantum class is the best feasible way of obtaining correlations
without revealing players’ types to a mediator.
6.3 Implementing the best belief-invariant equilibrium for GHZ with quantum
correlations
Consider the game of Section 4.1.2. The correlation Q described in (11) can be implemented
as a quantum correlated equilibrium, therefore it does not need an informed mediator. To see
this, we will now exhibit one of the constructions of the quantum state and the measurements
that produce the correlation.
Fix the computational basis to |0〉 =
[
1
0
]
and |1〉 =
[
0
1
]
and consider the following abbrevi-
ation for the tensor product: |xyz〉 = |x〉 ⊗ |y〉 ⊗ |z〉.
The state is then constructed as follows. Each player i holds a 2-dimensional quantum
system with Hilbert space Hi. Start from the following vector living in H = H1 ⊗H2 ⊗H3
|ψ〉 =
1
2
(|111〉 − |001〉 − |010〉 − |100〉),
and obtain the corresponding state on H:
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
The measurement operators are the following. For each player i, we have{
M00 =
1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
, M01 =
1
2
(
1 −1
−1 1
)}
(on input 0 ),{
M10 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, M11 =
(
0 0
0 1
)}
(on input 1 ).
It can be checked via eq.(22) that the above state and measurements produce the claimed
correlation Q.
Proposition 26. The considered quantum strategy is a quantum correlated equilibrium.
Proof. To prove the claim, we fix the measurements of any two parties and then show that the
third party by changing his measurements cannot increase his average payoff. Since the shared
state is symmetric under the permutation of parties, it is sufficient to consider the case in which
measurements of party-1 are variable and measurements of parties 2 and 3 are fixed to M ij ,
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where i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Measurements of party-1 can be expressed as X00 + X
0
1 = I (on input 0),
and X10 +X
1
1 = I (on input 1). The general operators defining these measurements are:
X00 =
1
2
(
α+ a3 a1 − ia2
a1 + ia2 α− a3
)
,
where (α,~a) ∈ R4, ~a = (a1, a2, a3), and ‖~a‖ ≤ α ≤ 2− ‖~a‖;
X10 =
1
2
(
β + b3 b1 − ib2
b1 + ib2 β − b3
)
,
where (β,~b) ∈ R4, ~b = (b1, b2, b3), and ‖~b‖ ≤ β ≤ 2− ‖~b‖.
Note that the constraints on the parameters in the above equations implies that ‖~a‖ ≤ 1 and
‖~b‖ ≤ 1.
The expected value of the i-th party, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is given by,
〈vi〉 =
∑
t,a
p(t) · Tr{ρ(M t1a1 ⊗M
t2
a2
⊗M t3a3)} · vi(t, a). (24)
On substituting the values for probability distribution of inputs, quantum probabilities, and
utilities, in eq.(24), and simplifying, we obtain that:
〈v1〉 = f0 + f1, where,
f0 =
1
12
{2− (1− ε)α + (1 + ε)a1},
f1 =
1
12
{1 + 3ε+ (1− ε)β + 2(1 + ε)b3}.
Now, using 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, and constraints on parameters (α,~a) and (β,~b), it follows that
f0 =
1
12
{2− (1− ε)α+ (1 + ε)a1}
≤
1
12
{2− (1− ε)‖~a‖+ (1 + ε)‖~a‖}
=
1
6
{1 + ε‖~a‖} ≤
1
6
{1 + ε} .
The upper bound on f0 is achieved for α = 1,~a = (1, 0, 0), therefore, max(f0) =
1
6 {1 + ε}.
Similarly,
f1 =
1
12
{1 + 3ε+ (1− ε)β + 2(1 + ε)b3}
≤
1
12
{
1 + 3ε+ (1− ε)
(
2− ‖~b‖
)
+ 2(1 + ε)‖~b‖
}
=
1
12
{
3 + ε+ (1 + 3ε)‖~b‖
}
≤
1
3
{1 + ε} .
The upper bound on f1 is achieved for β = 1,~b = (0, 0, 1), therefore, max(f1) =
1
3 {1 + ε} .
Finally,
max(〈v1〉) = max(f0) + max(f1) =
1 + ε
6
+
1 + ε
3
=
1 + ε
2
. (25)
Due to symmetry in the shared state, we get same results when varying the measurements of
some other party by keeping remaining two parties measurements fixed, therefore, max(〈vi〉) =
1+ε
2 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This proves that the considered strategy is a quantum equilibrium.
We remark that a similar approach (modifying the game in [GHSZ90]) has been used inde-
pendently in [SZY15] to obtain a 3-player quantum game with conflict of interest.
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6.4 A game with conflict of interest where quantum correlations achieve
optimal social welfare
We now introduce a variant of the three player game of Section 4.1.2, with a distribution of
types: p(0, 0, 1) = p(0, 1, 0) = p(1, 0, 0) = p(1, 1, 1) = 1/4, and with the following payoff table
(with 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 and δ = 2+ε3 ):
0 1
0 δ,δ,δ 0,0,0
1 0,0,0 ε,1,1
0
0 1
0 0,0,0 1,ε,1
1 1,1,ε 0,0,0
1
(a) τ = 0
0 1
0 0,0,0 1,1,ε
1 1,ε,1 0,0,0
0
0 1
0 ε,1,1 0,0,0
1 0,0,0 δ,δ,δ
1
(b) τ = 1
Figure 8: Another modified GHZ game. The figure is structured like Figure 3.
Clearly, players have conflict of interest in this modified GHZ game. This game has a very
interesting connection with the 3-party Mermin inequality [Mer90]:
|〈A0B0C1〉+ 〈A0B1C0〉+ 〈A1B0C0〉 − 〈A1B1C1〉| ≤ 2 (26)
where, for i, j, k ∈ {0, 1}, the random variables Ai, Bj , Ck take value ± 1.
In game theoretical terminology, it can be thought that i, j, k are types of the three players and
Ai, Bj , Ck ∈ {±1} correspond to the respective actions. The expected values of the product of
the outcomes are:
〈AiBjCk〉 = {P
ijk(+1,+1,+1) + P ijk(+1,−1,−1) + P ijk(−1,+1,−1) + P ijk(−1,−1,+1)}
− {P ijk(−1,−1,−1) + P ijk(−1,+1,+1) + P ijk(+1,−1,+1) + P ijk(+1,+1,−1)}.
We do the following relabelling of the actions: −1 7→ 0 and +1 7→ 1, and we get (by labelling
the actions in the subscript):
〈AiBjCk〉 = {P
ijk
111 + P
ijk
100 + P
ijk
010 + P
ijk
001}
− {P ijk000 + P
ijk
011 + P
ijk
101 + P
ijk
110}
(27)
On substituting (27) in (26), using normalization condition for probabilities, and rearranging,
we get,
|
{
1− 2(P 001000 + P
001
011 + P
001
101 + P
001
110 )
}
+
{
1− 2(P 010000 + P
010
011 + P
010
101 + P
010
110 )
}
+
{
1− 2(P 100000 + P
100
011 + P
100
101 + P
100
110 )
}
−
{
2(P 111001 + P
111
010 + P
111
100 + P
111
111 )− 1
}
| ≤ 2
On simplifying we get:
1 ≤ P ≤ 3
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where,
P = (P 001000 + P
001
011 + P
001
101 + P
001
110 )
+ (P 010000 + P
010
011 + P
010
101 + P
010
110 )
+ (P 100000 + P
100
011 + P
100
101 + P
100
110 )
+ (P 111001 + P
111
010 + P
111
100 + P
111
111 ).
Let M = 〈A0B0C1〉 + 〈A0B1C0〉 + 〈A1B0C0〉 − 〈A1B1C1〉, then M = 4 − 2P. The bound we
see on quantity M is derived by considering all possible local correlations, therefore, nonlocal
(quantum, no-signalling, or signalling) correlations can violate these bounds. However, M also
has algebraic bounds, −4 ≤M ≤ 4, which is respected by any type of correlation (or probability
distribution). The algebraic restriction on M implies that 0 ≤ P ≤ 4 for any type of correlation.
One important feature of Mermin inequality is that its algebraic bounds can be achieved by
quantum correlations. We will use this feature of the Mermin inequality to discover interesting
properties in the game that we are considering here.
For the game of Figure 8, the sum of expected payoffs of the three players turns out to be:
〈v1〉+ 〈v2〉+ 〈v3〉 =
(
2 + ε
4
)
P. (28)
For any local strategy (correlated or uncorrelated)
P ≤ 3 ⇔ 〈v1〉+ 〈v2〉+ 〈v3〉 ≤
3
4
(2 + ε). (29)
For any possible strategies (quantum, belief-invariant or communicating):
P ≤ 4 ⇔ 〈v1〉+ 〈v2〉+ 〈v3〉 ≤ 2 + ε. (30)
If the game is played with the same correlation (11) (which we implemented as a quantum
strategy in Section 6.3), the expected payoff 〈vi〉 =
2+ε
3 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Moreover, the strategy is
a quantum equilibrium (the proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 26; only the objective
function changes which is again easy to maximize).
Therefore, an interesting feature of the game of Figure 8 is that with the considered quantum
protocol we obtain the optimal fair equilibrium, i.e, no other quantum equilibrium, belief-
invariant equilibrium, or even communication equilibrium can do better than this protocol in
our second GHZ game. This is a new feature which was not revealed in the two party modified
CHSH-game considered in [PKL+15] where optimal fair quantum correlated equilibrium was
found, however, for the modified CHSH-game belief-invariant equilibrium, and communication
equilibrium can do better than the optimal quantum fair equilibrium.
7 Conclusions and open problems
We have formally introduced the class of belief-invariant communication equilibria and its quan-
tum mechanical version. Even if such classes appeared implicitly in previous work, a systematic
study and an hunt for useful applications was not performed before. With this work we would
like to open the way for collaboration between the quantum information and the game theory
community, to address the numerous open problems. We conclude the paper with a list of the
ones we could think of.
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1. Complete the complexity scenario. In Section 3.4 we discuss some computational complex-
ity facts. For example, verifying that a solution is an equilibrium is easy if the number of
actions is bounded, while finding the optimal (quantum) correlated equilibrium is a hard
task, given the connection with multi-prover interactive proofs. However, how difficult is
to sample a quantum or a belief-invariant equilibrium? Are there classes of games where
this is easy, like the succinct games of [PR08]?
2. Get large separations and upper bound the largest possible separation. Full coordination
games are used to design Bell tests, experiments that quantify how different quantum
mechanics is from classical physics. For this fundamental task, the quantity of interest
is the separation between the largest expected payoff at a quantum and at a correlated
equilibrium. The race for large separations was settled in [BRSdW12], where the authors
exhibited a game that almost matches the upper bound proven in [JPPG+10]. In our
context here, large separations would translate to economical or social convenience of
implementing communication equilibria while respecting the privacy of the player. Are
there conflict-of-interest games where the quantum correlated equilibrium leads to a much
better social optimum than the correlated one? Is there an upper bound like the one of
[JPPG+10]?
3. Can any non-local game be converted in a conflict-of-interest game? This is a question
from [PKL+15]. The non-local games are the above-mentioned coordination games used
in physics. It would be interesting if all these games also lead to cases in which a conflict-
of-interest situation can be improved with quantum or belief-invariant correlations.
4. Application to other relevant games. This is a very natural question. Can belief-invariance
be beneficial for scheduling problems, market dynamics, and any other topic of practical
interest?
5. Development of automatic belief-invariant advice on large network games. We have shown
in Section 5 that belief-invariance can be useful in network games. Can we design an auto-
matic system that calculates and distributes belief-invariant advice to large-scale network,
in order to reduce the congestion? This does not need to be optimal, and an approximation
would already have great practical applications.
Acknowledgements
This work is partially supported by the European Commission (STREP “RAQUEL”), by the
Spanish MINECO (grants FIS2013-40627-P, FIS2016-80681-P and MTM2014-54240-P) with
the support of FEDER funds, by the Generalitat de Catalunya CIRIT (project 2014-SGR-966),
by the ERC (AdG “IRQUAT”), by the Comunidad de Madrid (project QUITEMAD+-CM,
S2013/ICE-2801). This work was made possible through the support of grant #48322 from
the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. VA and
DF are supported by GNCS - INdAM.
The authors thank Andris Ambainis, Oihane Gallo Ferna´ndez, Boris Ginzburg, Dmitry
Kravchenko, Giuseppe Persiano, Miklo´s Pinte´r, Laura Santucci, Johannes Schneider and Ronald
de Wolf for useful discussions that improved the accessibility and the content of the paper. Fur-
thermore, we acknowledge interesting conversations with Ignacio Villanueva, Carlos Palazuelos
and David Pe´rez Garc´ıa on the open problem regarding large separations between quantum and
classical advice in relation to the degree of competitiveness of the game.
32
References
[AMO08] David Avis, Sonoko Moriyama, and Masaki Owari. From Bell inequalities to
Tsirelson’s theorem: A survey. arXiv preprint arXiv:0812.4887, 2008.
[AT01] Aaron Archer and E´va Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In
42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2001, 14-17
October 2001, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, pages 482–491, 2001.
[Aum74] Robert J. Aumann. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal
of mathematical Economics, 1(1):67–96, 1974.
[Bel64] John S. Bell. On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. Physics, 1(3):195–200,
1964.
[BFS14] Harry Buhrman, Serge Fehr, and Christian Schaffner. On the parallel repetition
of multi-player games: The no-signaling case. In 9th Conference on the Theory of
Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography, page 24, 2014.
[BL13] Nicolas Brunner and Noah Linden. Connection between Bell nonlocality and
Bayesian game theory. Nature Communications, 4, July 2013.
[BLM+05] Jonathan Barrett, Noah Linden, Serge Massar, Stefano Pironio, Sandu Popescu,
and David Roberts. Nonlocal correlations as an information-theoretic resource.
Physical Review A, 71(2):022101, 2005.
[BRSdW12] Harry Buhrman, Oded Regev, Giannicola Scarpa, and Ronald de Wolf. Near-
optimal and explicit Bell inequality violations. Theory of Computing, 8(27):623–
645, 2012.
[CDT09] Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng. Settling the complexity of computing
two-player Nash equilibria. J. ACM, 56(3):14:1–14:57, May 2009.
[CHSH69] John F. Clauser, Michael A. Horne, Abner Shimony, and Richard A. Holt. Proposed
experiment to test local hidden-variable theories. Phys. Rev. Lett., 23:880–884, Oct
1969.
[CLPR15] Rachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, Mallesh M. Pai, and Aaron Roth. The strange
case of privacy in equilibrium models. CoRR, abs/1508.03080, 2015.
[CMN+07] Peter J. Cameron, Ashley Montanaro, Michael W. Newman, Simone Severini, and
Andreas Winter. On the quantum chromatic number of a graph. Electron. J.
Combin, 14(1), 2007.
[DGP09] Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W Goldberg, and Christos H. Papadimitriou. The
complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium. SIAM Journal on Computing,
39(1):195–259, 2009.
[For82] Franc¸oise Forges. A first study of correlated equilibria in repeated games with
incomplete information. Core discussion paper 8218, Universite´ Catholique de
Louvain, 1982.
[For88] Franc¸oise Forges. Can sunspots replace a mediator? Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 17(4):347–368, 1988.
33
[For93] Franc¸oise Forges. Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games
with incomplete information. Theory and Decision, 35(3):277–310, 1993.
[For06] Franc¸oise Forges. Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
revisited. Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/157, Paris
Dauphine University, December 2006.
[FRV16] Rotem Arnon Friedman, Renato Renner, and Thomas Vidick. Non-signaling par-
allel repetition using de Finetti reductions. IEEE Trans. Information Theory,
62(3):1440–1457, 2016.
[FT91] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.
[GFInG16] Ohiane Gallo Ferna´ndez and Elena In˜arra Garc´ıa. Rationing rules and
stable coalition structures. IKERLANAK working paper series IL100/16.
http://hdl.handle.net/10810/19435, 2016.
[GHSZ90] Daniel M. Greenberger, Michael A. Horne, Abner Shimony, and Anton Zeilinger.
Bell’s theorem without inequalities. American Journal of Physics, 58(12):1131–
1143, 1990.
[GZK08] Hong Guo, Juheng Zhang, and Gary J. Koehler. A survey of quantum games.
Decision Support Systems, 46(1):318 – 332, 2008.
[HS89] Sergiu Hart and David Schmeidler. Existence of correlated equilibria. Mathematics
of Operations Research, 14(1):18–25, 1989.
[JPPG+10] Marius Junge, Carlos Palazuelos, David Pe´rez-Garc´ıa, Ignacio Villanueva, and
Michael M. Wolf. Unbounded violations of bipartite Bell inequalities via operator
space theory. Communications in Mathematical Physics, 300(3):715–739, 2010.
[KRR14] Yael Tauman Kalai, Ran Raz, and Ron D. Rothblum. How to delegate computa-
tions: The power of no-signaling proofs. In Proceedings of the 46th Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’14, pages 485–494, 2014.
[LH64] Carlton E. Lemke and Joseph T. Howson. Equilibrium points of bimatrix games.
Journal of the Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics, 12(2):413–423, 1964.
[Liu15] Qingmin Liu. Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete informa-
tion. Journal of Economic Theory, 157:49 – 75, 2015.
[LM05] Pierfrancesco La Mura. Correlated equilibria of classical strategic games with
quantum signals. International Journal of Quantum Information, 03(01):183–188,
2005.
[LRS10] Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg, and Eran Shmaya. Signaling and mediation in
games with common interests. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2):670–682,
2010.
[LW15] Ce´cilia Lancien and Andreas Winter. Parallel repetition and concentration for
(sub-) no-signalling games via a flexible constrained de Finetti reduction. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1506.07002, 2015.
[MAG06] Lluis Masanes, Antonio Acin, and Nicolas Gisin. General properties of nonsignaling
theories. Physical Review A, 73(1):012112, 2006.
34
[Mer90] N. David Mermin. Extreme quantum entanglement in a superposition of macro-
scopically distinct states. Phys. Rev. Lett., 65:1838–1840, Oct 1990.
[Mye91] Roger B. Myerson. Game theory : analysis of conflict. Harvard university press,
1997, Cambridge (Mass.), London, 1991.
[Nas50] John F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 36(1):48–49, 1950.
[NC00] Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L Chuang. Quantum computation and quantum
information. Cambridge university press, 2000.
[NRTV07] Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, E´va Tardos, and Vijay V. Vazirani. Algorithmic
Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
[Pal15] Carlos Palazuelos. Random constructions in Bell inequalities: A survey. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1502.02175, 2015.
[PKL+15] Anna Pappa, Niraj Kumar, Thomas Lawson, Miklos Santha, Shengyu Zhang, Eleni
Diamanti, and Iordanis Kerenidis. Nonlocality and conflicting interest games. Phys.
Rev. Lett., 114:020401, Jan 2015.
[PR94] Sandu Popescu and Daniel Rohrlich. Quantum nonlocality as an axiom. Founda-
tions of Physics, 24(3):379–385, 1994.
[PR08] Christos H. Papadimitriou and Tim Roughgarden. Computing correlated equilibria
in multi-player games. J. ACM, 55(3):14:1–14:29, August 2008.
[PR13] Mallesh M. Pai and Aaron Roth. Privacy and mechanism design. ACM SIGecom
Exchanges, 12(1):8–29, 2013.
[RC66] Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah. The game of chicken. American
Behavioral Scientist, 10(3):10–28, 1966.
[RMG+16] Arup Roy, Amit Mukherjee, Tamal Guha, Sibasish Ghosh, Some Sankar Bhat-
tacharya, and Manik Banik. Nonlocal correlations: Fair and unfair strategies in
bayesian games. Phys. Rev. A, 94:032120, Sep 2016.
[SZY15] Haozhen Situ, Cai Zhang, and Fang Yu. Quantum advice enhances social opti-
mality in three-party conflicting interest games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.06918,
2015.
[Tsi80] Boris S. Tsirelson. Quantum generalizations of Bell’s inequality. Lett. Math. Phys.,
4(2):93–100, 1980.
[vNM44] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton University Press, 1944.
[Wil13] Mark M. Wilde. Quantum information theory. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
arXiv:1106.1445.
[Zha12] Shengyu Zhang. Quantum strategic game theory. In Proceedings of the 3rd Inno-
vations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS ’12, pages 39–59, New
York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
35
